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Unconventional monetary policy and the ‘currency wars’ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the 2000s, several central banks experimented with unconventional monetary policies (UMP) 
aimed at boosting nominal spending. UMP-adopters have been accused of seeking to depreciate 
their exchange rates to gain a competitive advantage in international trade. For example, Brazilian 
Finance Minister Guido Mantega stated, “We’re in the midst of an international currency war, a 
general weakening of currency. This threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness... 
(Financial Times, September 27, 2010).” We shed light on the ‘currency war’ accusation by 
examining whether the adoption of UMP was associated with different exchange rate behavior in 
adopter countries relative to others. The large amount of empirical work on the impact of UMP 
has focused mainly on the effects on interest rates and bond yields of large scale asset purchases 
by central banks (see Gagnon, 2016, for a survey). Studies of exchange rate effects of UMP relate 
mainly to the impact of negative policy interest rates (NPIR) introduced by several central banks 
from 2012 (e.g., Molyneux et al., 2017; Arteta et al., 2016; Ball et al., 2016; Jobst and Lin, 2016; 
Hameed and Rose, 2016). In general, these studies focus on the average impact on exchange rates 
and suggest few if any important effects; our approach focuses on UMP more generally and on its 
“differential effect” on the exchange rates of adopter and non-adopter countries.  
 
2. Methodology and data 
 
Our baseline differences-in-differences specification takes the following form:  
 
𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
where 𝐹𝑋𝑡 is the exchange rate variable in country i at time t, 𝑇𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the country is an UMP-adopter and 0 otherwise, and captures possible differences between the 
UMP-adopters and non-adopters prior to the policy change; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in the post-UMP adoption period in both UMP-adopter and non-adopter countries and captures 
aggregate factors that would cause changes in exchange rate behavior in the absence of a policy 
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change; (𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) is the difference-in-difference estimator that captures the average difference 
in exchange rate behavior between UMP-adopters and non-adopters; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of controls that 
includes exchange rate regime flexibility and whether a country has adopted an inflation targeting 
regime. We also include 𝛿𝑖 and 𝜑𝑡, to capture country and year fixed effects. 𝐹𝑋𝑡 is represented 
alternately by the volatility of the bilateral exchange rate, the (log) level of the bilateral exchange 
rate, the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate, and the (log) level of the nominal and 
real effective exchange rate. 
 
The data panel comprises 26 countries plus the eurozone, includes five UMP-adopter central 
banks, and spans January 2000 to December 2016. Data on bilateral and effective exchange rates 
are from central bank websites and the Bank for International Settlements. The volatility of 
effective exchange rates is measured by the standard deviation of the daily percent change and the 
dollar is the base currency for the analysis of bilateral rates. The exchange rate regime is the 
“coarse” classification devised by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), updated through 2016 by Ilzetzki 
et al. (2017ab). Inflation targeting countries are from Hammond (2012). Table 1 provides the dates 
of the start of major asset purchase periods by the UMP-adopters. Except for Japan, these started 
from late 2008, and in our baseline we employ a common start date of January 2009.  
 
3. Empirical results 
 
Table 2 reports baseline estimates with and without controls. The results for th    e bilateral 
exchange rates in Panel A of the table suggest no difference in exchange rate volatility between 
UMP-adopters and non-adopters but that UMP adoption was associated with a depreciation in the 
level of the bilateral exchange rate relative to the currencies of non-adopters—i.e., the coefficient 
on (T*Post) is negative and statistically significant, with the average treatment effect equivalent 
to an 11-13% relative depreciation. The coefficients on (T*Post) for the nominal effective 
exchange rate reported in Panel B indicate that UMP-adopters had more volatile effective 
exchange rates (3-5%) than non-adopters, and that UMP adoption also depreciated the nominal 
effective exchange rate relative to that of non-adopters (by 1-3%). The results in panel C show that 
UMP-adopters experienced a depreciation in the level of the real effective exchange rate (by 17-
18%) relative to non-adopters. Accordingly, our baseline results offer some support to the 
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‘currency wars’ accusers by suggesting that UMP was associated with greater depreciation of 
bilateral and effective exchanges in adopter countries. The coefficients on the control variables 
suggest that a more flexible exchange rate regime and inflation targeting are associated with greater 
exchange rate volatility. 
 
We employ three robustness tests. First, we exclude Japan from the sample because of its much 
earlier adoption of UMP. These results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The conclusions do not 
change: UMP adoption is associated with greater volatility of bilateral and nominal effective 
exchange rates, and a depreciation of the bilateral and effective exchange rates relative to non-
adoption. Second, we control for a misidentification of the start date of UMP by shifting the date 
to 2007. These results are reported in Panel B and show that the volatility of the nominal effective 
exchange rate was greater for UMP-adopters and that their bilateral, nominal and real effective 
exchange rates depreciated relative to those of non-adopters. Finally, in Panel C we report 
estimates for euro-based bilateral exchange rate volatility and exchange rate levels to ensure that 
the currency base did not distort the results. These results also suggest that UMP was associated 
with greater relative volatility and depreciation of the bilateral exchange rate though in the latter 
case the coefficient on (T*P) is significant at only the 10% level. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
We asked whether the adoption of UMP by several countries resulted in a different behavior of 
their exchange rates relative to those of countries that did not adopt UMP. Our results, which 
appear reasonably robust, suggest that the effective exchange rates of UMP-adopters were 
generally more volatile, and that the levels of their bilateral, nominal and real effective exchange 
rates depreciated, relative to non-adopters. Accordingly, we view our results give some support to 
those accusing UMP-adopters of having engaged in a ‘currency war’, whether by design or 
accident. 
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Table 1. Start dates for unconventional monetary policies1 
Country/central bank Start date 
European Central Bank May 2009; January 2015; March 2016 
Japan March 2001; October 2010; August 2011; October 
2011; April 2013; October 2014 
Sweden February 2015 
United Kingdom March 2009; November 2009; October 2011; February 
2002; July 2012; August 2016 
United States November 2008; November 2010; December 2012 
Sources: Central bank websites. 
1 Defined as the start of periods of large-scale asset purchases as stated by the different central banks. 
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Table 2. Baseline estimate: Unconventional monetary policy and exchange rates 
A. Bilateral exchange rate versus US dollar 
 Volatility  Level 
Post   0.007 
(0.033) 
 0.055*** 
(0.016) 
 -0.029 
(0.018) 
-0.114 
(0.020) 
Treat -0.047*** 
(0.012) 
-0.104*** 
(0.017) 
 -0.999*** 
(0.007) 
-1.665*** 
(0.202) 
Post*Treat  0.014 
(0.017) 
 0.040 
(0.032) 
 -0.134*** 
(0.013) 
-0.112*** 
(0.007) 
Exchange rate regime   0.163*** 
(0.028) 
  -0.591** 
(0.261) 
Inflation targeter   0.047 
(0.041) 
   1.181*** 
(0.183) 
Intercept  0.654*** 
(0.026) 
 0.146*** 
(0.046) 
  2.632*** 
(0.010) 
 3.505*** 
(0.653) 
R2  0.001  0.081   0.030  0.150 
Observations 5299 4767  5280 5076 
      
B. Nominal effective exchange rate 
 Volatility  Level 
Post  0.015 
(0.024) 
 0.036*** 
(0.012) 
 -0.033 
(0.046) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Treat -0.113*** 
(0.010) 
-0.256*** 
(0.018) 
  0.045 
(0.070) 
 0.099*** 
(0.028) 
Post*Treat  0.033** 
(0.014) 
 0.053*** 
(0.018) 
  0.014 
(0.065) 
-0.032*** 
(0.001) 
Exchange rate regime   0.156*** 
(0.014) 
  -0.004 
(0.026) 
Inflation targeter   0.079*** 
(0.019) 
  -0.045 
(0.050) 
Intercept  0.495*** 
(0.018) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
  4.583*** 
(0.034) 
 4.615*** 
(0.038) 
R2  0.011  0.147   0.022  0.054 
Observations 5508 4969  5508 5304 
      
C. Real effective exchange rate 
    Level 
Post     0.066*** 
(0.007) 
 0.091*** 
(0.001) 
Treat     0.190*** 
(0.008) 
 0.267*** 
(0.002) 
Post*Treat    -0.173*** 
(0.009) 
-0.181*** 
(0.001) 
Exchange rate regime      0.034*** 
(0.005) 
Inflation targeter      0.016 
(0.014) 
Intercept     4.502*** 
(0.005) 
 4.563*** 
(0.024) 
R2     0.158  0.237 
Observations    5508 5304 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Robustness tests: excluding Japan; changing UMP start date; and bilateral rate versus the euro 
 Bilateral exchange rate Nominal effective 
exchange rate 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
 Volatility Level Volatility Level Level 
A. Treatment group excludes Japan     
Post -0.018 
(0.016) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
 0.004 
(0.024) 
-0.030*** 
(0.010) 
 0.067*** 
(0.001) 
Treat -0.116*** 
(0.025) 
-1.683*** 
(0.049) 
-0.256*** 
(0.019) 
 0.087*** 
(0.027) 
 0.237*** 
(0.002) 
Post*Treat  0.071** 
(0.034) 
-0.098*** 
(0.000) 
 0.049*** 
(0.015) 
-0.014*** 
(0.001) 
-0.164*** 
(0.001) 
Exchange rate regime  0.163*** 
 (0.028) 
 0.593* 
(0.084) 
 0.154*** 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.026) 
 0.033*** 
(0.003) 
Inflation targeter  0.053 
(0.041) 
 1.178** 
(0.076) 
 0.087*** 
(0.018) 
-0.044 
(0.049) 
 0.018 
(0.024) 
Intercept  0.182*** 
(0.047) 
 3.474*** 
(0.181) 
 0.010 
(0.022) 
 4.625*** 
(0.037) 
 4.580*** 
(0.024) 
R2  0.078  0.150   0.145  0.061  0.202 
Observations 4767 5076 5304 5304 5304 
 
B. UMP begins 2007 
   
Post  0.055** 
(0.016) 
-0.114*** 
(0.020) 
 0.036*** 
(0.012) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
 0.091*** 
(0.001) 
Treat -0.104*** 
(0.017) 
-1.665*** 
(0.202) 
-0.256*** 
(0.018) 
 0.099*** 
(0.028) 
 0.267*** 
(0.002) 
Post*Treat  0.040 
(0.032) 
-0.112*** 
(0.007) 
 0.053*** 
(0.018) 
-0.032*** 
(0.001) 
-0.181*** 
(0.001) 
Exchange rate regime  0.163*** 
(0.028) 
-0.591** 
(0.261) 
 0.156*** 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.026) 
 0.034*** 
(0.005) 
Inflation targeter  0.047 
(0.041) 
 1.181*** 
(0.183) 
 0.079*** 
(0.019) 
-0.045 
(0.050) 
 0.016 
(0.014) 
Intercept  0.146*** 
(0.046) 
 3.505 
(0.653) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
 4.615*** 
(0.038) 
 4.563*** 
(0.024) 
R2  0.081  0.150  0.147  0.054  0.237 
Observations 4767 5076 4969 5304 5304 
 
C Bilateral exchange rate versus euro 
    
Post  0.060* 
(0.031) 
-0.030 
(0.030) 
   
Treat -0.142*** 
(0.025) 
-0.717 
(0.615) 
   
Post*Treat  0.052*** 
(0.020) 
-0.058* 
(0.030) 
   
Exchange rate regime  0.175*** 
(0.018) 
-0.206 
(0.574) 
   
Inflation targeter  0.068*** 
(0.022) 
 0.436 
(1.104) 
   
Intercept  0.099*** 
(0.030) 
 3.025*** 
(0.840) 
   
R2  0.081  0.034    
Observations 4767 5280    
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
  
  
 
Appendix Table. Unconventional monetary policy (UMP) adopters and non-adopters in the 
country sample 
 
UMP-adopters (treatment group): 
 
European central bank (eurozone countries), Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States 
 
Non-adopters (control group): 
 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Hungary, India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, South Africa, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey 
 
 
 
 
